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Abstract
Poor households  in rural  areas are particularly vulnerable  the poor cope with catastrophic  weather  events, the
to risks that reduce incomes and increase expenditures.  authors use Mexico  as a case  study.
Most past research  has focused  on risk-coping strategies  In Mexico, poor  households are exposed to systemic
for the rural poor, specifically on  micro-level and  risks,  such as droughts  and floods, that affect the
household actions. These are risks that can  be shared  economic  livelihood of their region.  Catastrophic
within a community or extended family.  These strategies  insurance  is useful for small farmers, although
are  effective  for independent  risks, but  ineffective  for  commercially oriented small farmers  may wish to obtain
covariate  or systemic risks.  coverage  for less catastrophic events.  Weather insurance
Skees,  Varangis, Larson,  and Siegel focus on private  could meet  this need.  It pays out according to the
and public mechanisms for managing covariate  risk for  frequency  and intensity of specific weather events.
natural  disasters. When many households within the  Because weather  insurance depends  on the occurrence
same community  face  risks that create losses for all,  and objective measure  of intensity of a specific event, it
traditional  coping mechanisms  are likely to  fail. Such  does not require  individual farm inspection  that can be
covariate  risks are not uncommon  in many developing  very  costly for small farms.
countries,  especially where farming remains a  major  The authors  argue that a key issue of delivering
source of income.  The authors focus on  risks related to  insurance to small farmers is the existence  of producer
weather events  (such as excess rain,  droughts, freezes,  organizations.  In Mexico, the farmer mutual insurance
and high winds) that have a severe  impact on rural  funds provide  a good example. These funds  provide
incomes. Weather  insurance  could cover the covariate  insurance to their members by pulling together resources
risk for a community of poor households through  formal  to pay for future indemnities  and reinsures  itself from
and informal risk-sharing  arrangements  among  major systemic risks that could hurt simultaneously  all
households that are purchasing these weather contracts.  their members.
Given recent Mexican innovations targeted  at helping
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Introduction
Poor households with little or no wealth are particularly vulnerable to risks that reduce
incomes and increase expenditures.  This paper addresses many of the risk-coping strategies
for the rural poor, with a focus on micro level and household actions. Largely, these
discussions concern  risks that can be shared within a community or extended  family. While
effective for independent risks, these strategies are rather ineffective for covariate  or
systemic risks.
This paper focuses on private and public mechanisms for managing such covariate risk for
natural disasters. When many households within the same community face risks that create
contemporaneous  losses for all, the coping mechanisms that rely on cooperative community
action are likely to fail. Such covariate risks are not uncommon  in many developing
countries, especially where farming remains a major source of income.
Two sources of covariate risk are common:  1) market risks (prices for output and inputs);
and 2) natural disaster risks (hurricanes, droughts,  floods, frosts, earthquakes,  volcanic
eruptions, etc.). While far from perfect, market mechanisms are generally available for
managing some market-related risks. For example, even in developing  countries, futures
exchange markets offer some risk management possibilities  for internationally traded
commodities.  The traditional market-based  instrument for managing natural disaster risk,
insurance,  is largely underdeveloped  and unavailable in most parts of the world. Further,
insurance  alone will not address the problems faced by rural households  when natural
disasters occur.
This paper focuses on risks that are related to weather events  (excess rain, droughts,
freezes, high winds, etc.)  that have a severe impact on rural incomes. Given the growing
interest in weather insurance markets, there are opportunities for innovation that have, as of
yet, been largely unexploited.  A number of studies are recognizing that markets may more
easily provide rainfall insurance than traditional  crop insurance in many developing
countries  (Gautum et al.  1994, Sakurai and Reardon  1997, Skees, Hazell and Miranda  1999,
and Skees 2000). In addition, we discuss using such parametric  insurance to cover covariate
risk for a community of poor households through formal and informal risk-sharing
arrangement among households that are purchasing these index contracts. This is a
potentially important innovation since instruments  for systemic risk can complement the
approaches  for managing idiosyncratic risks that are described in previous chapters of this
volume. Finally, we take our analysis one step further and argue that the basic infrastructure
and contracts that are needed to index and insure catastrophic weather events can also be
used to support emergency disaster assistance in developing countries.Given some recent Mexi:can  innovations that are targeted at helping the poor cope with
catastrophic weather events, we use Mexico as a case study to support some of our general
concepts. Mexico has a couple of unique institutional innovations that could be combined
with well-crafted weather indexes that use new developments in the international  financial
markets. Not only could such indexes be developed to offer insurance  to the rural poor, but
the same indexes can be crafted to allow improvized governments unique opportunities to
hedge budgetary exposure when they provide free disaster aid to the poor. However,  we
also raise questions about the design of these assistance programmes and the level of
assistance  since such assistance can provide perverse incentives  and many times have
unintended consequences.
We assume that the goal of government intervention after a natural disaster is to provide the
most cost effective  form of government aid that will help the rural poor. This aid should be
provided  in an objective fashion with ex ante rules for when and how much assistance to
provide.  Further, the assistance should not unduly distort economic incentives.  In
particular,  care should be taken to assure that aid does not spur unsustainable new
economic activity in areas that are more risky or vulnerable to natural disaster risk. Doing
so will likely result in more losses and suffering when the next disaster strikes.  Finally,
there are alternative ways of structuring  such aid so that it facilitates rather than crowds out
international and domestic risk.
We argue that government should define disaster and catastrophe within the context of
frequency as well as severity. For example, itl  would be a mistake and very expensive  to
have government intervention too frequently.  The infrequent events that create serious
problems may require some level of governmient  intervention, such as free disaster aid.
Those events that are more frequent but still cause serious losses may be more
appropriately  left to private sector insurance  markets if the transaction costs of such
insurance can be contained.  Our solutions involve segmenting and layering the natural
disaster risk so that the most catastrophic risk is handled with government aid and the less
catastrophic risk is left to market mechanisms.
Risk and the rural poor
Siegel and Alwang (1999) develop a taxonomy of risk-coping strategies for rural
households facing risk. However,  as mentioned, many strategies are unavailable or prove
ineffective for the poor, especially when the iisks are covariate.  Households  living on very
low incomes and limited wealth become highly risk adverse since even a small disruption
in income flows can have devastating  effects. Such risk aversion retards the development
process by limiting household incentives to adopt productivity-enhancing  technologies and
to specialize in activities where comparative  advantages  exist. Such risks also affect the
credit-worthiness of rural households and constrain credit markets.
Given the nature of risk for the rural poor, it is quite logical to expect rural households to
diversify their sources of income. Recent literature  has reemphasized the role of
diversification in development.  Ellis (1998) argues that diversification in poor rural areas
2may not be 'a transient phenomenon'.  Diversification may be used both under conditions of
economic improvement as well as economic  decline.
It is intuitive to expect small landowners to have limited opportunities for income from
farming. These households  use their labour resources in a variety of ways. Working on
other farms in the community for either direct income or in-kind payments is common
among the rural poor. Even the jobs that do not involve farm work may be directly related
to agricultural production in some fashion  (e.g., food processing,  transportation, or input
supply for farming). By the same token the well being of the farming sector can have a
direct bearing on jobs that are not tied directly to agriculture.
Since many of the sources of the diversified portfolio of income remain tied to the well
being of farming in the community,  any shocks that hurt the local agricultural output can
place the diversified income of the rural poor in jeopardy. For example, a wide spread
natural disaster (drought or flood) that creates significant yield loss for crops and damages
grassing lands for livestock can have a devastating impact on all sources of income. Thus,
even a well-diversified  portfolio of income  for the rural poor may still be vulnerable to a
significant covariate risk - natural disasters.
Consider the effect of a major drought on a poor rural household.  First, any crops that are
being grown by the household for either household consumption or for sale will be
damaged.  Further, if the household has livestock, the pasture and other forage sources will
also be damaged in a major drought.  The household will either be forced to purchase  feed,
sell the livestock,  or move the livestock  to a region not impacted by the drought.  All of
these risk coping strategies will be costly. Mass selling of livestock during a major drought
will depress livestock prices. Beyond the commodities grown on the farm, a major drought
will also likely hurt the opportunities  for selling the household labour to other farmers in
the community. For example,  opportunities to earn income by selling labour to harvest a
crop are generally directly tied to the amount of the harvest.
Since non-agricultural jobs are closely tied to the farm incomes in many communities,  a
major drought may also affect off-farm job opportunities for the rural poor. Ellis reviews
the literature on the multiplier effect of farm  income in rural communities.  In general these
studies suggest that the non-farm economy grows at about the same pace as the farm
economy  (a US$  1 increase in farm economy growth results in a US$ 1 increase in the non-
farm economy  growth). Furthermore,  after reviewing the literature, Ellis concludes that for
many rural areas in developing countries, the rural non-farm sector has little capacity to
generate growth on it's own. Agricultural  growth and well-being are the engines of growth
for the non-farm sector in many parts of the world.
When the diversified portfolio of income for the rural poor remains tied to farm production,
covariate risk from a widespread natural disaster will still jeopardize the income flows for
households  even though they have multiple sources of income.  Since covariate risks also
cause market failure in capital markets and limit the access to credit, there are further
general welfare gains that may be tied to efficient systems that can be used to manage
natural disaster risk.
3Mexico  as a case study
Mexico offers an interesting case to examine many of the concepts presented in this paper.
Poor small farmers in Mexico primarily use their on-farm agricultural production for
household consumption (e.g.,  food staples such as maize and beans, and livestock
products), use little if any improved technologies  (e.g.,  little or no purchased inputs such as
improved seeds or fertilizer), and usually depend on a single growing cycle using rain-fed
agriculture.  In contrast, there are small farmers who might also have small landholdings,
but who use improved technologies,  are more commercially oriented, and many of whom
have access to irrigation and can grow more than one crop per year (and in most cases have
other assets, such as good social capital location/infrastructure  and institutions).
Another important characteristic of many resource poor small farmers is the relatively low
share of on-farm agricultural production in total household income (World Bank,  1996).
For small farmers, in general,  a significant proportion of total household income comes
from off-farm activities.  Table 1 summarizes sources of income for Mexican farmers by
farm size.
Table 1: Sources of income by farm size in hectares, 1995
Total  0-2  2-5  5-10  10-18  >18
Agriculture  50%  22%  35%  47%  55%  72%
Non-agriculture  36%  58%  50%  36%  29%  24%
Remittances  14%  20%  16%  17%  16%  3%
Source:  Casco and Rosensweig  (2000).
Table 1 shows that for iarmers having 5 hectares or less, only 22-35 per cent of household
income comes  from agriculture.  In contrast, for farmers with over 10 hectares the share of
agricultural  to total household income ranges between 55-72 per cent. Still, in most cases,
own-farm  agricultural production is referred to as agricultural production and all other
economic activities are referred to as non-agricultural  activities. In reality, a major source
of income for many small farmers is off-farm agricultural employment (as wage labour for
other, usually larger farmers).  In addition, there are many economic activities in the rural
economy that are closely linked to agricultural production.  Thus, small farmers  are
indirectly dependent on the ups and downs of agricultural incomes (and thus, yield and
price risks) faced by medium and large farmers, and risks faced by others in the rural
economy.
For small farmers, who use little purchased inputs and self-finance their production, their
direct exposure to agriculture  (yield or price risk) is relatively low. These small farmers
tend to use low risk-low return technologies  and cropping patterns to minimize yield losses.
And as their marketed surplus tends to be small, their exposure to price risks is rather
limited. In fact, it might even be more important for poor small farmers to obtain insurance
that reflects agricultural production off their farm - that is - commercial agricultural
production  activities that dominate the rural economy.  One of the advantages of weather
based index insurance  is that it can be designed to compensate  for revenue shortfalls  for
4both producers  and non-producers  in the rural economy.  Small farm households  in Mexico
also tend to have livestock in addition to crops. Here again, insurance that protects against
pasture or forage shortfalls due to adverse weather may be important for those having
livestock.
Beyond the interesting aspects of small farn  agriculture in Mexico, Mexico has two major
innovations that have direct bearing on the concepts presented in this chapter:  1) the Fondos
which are mutual insurance funds whose members are commercially oriented small
farmers; and 2) FONDEN,  which is a Federal programme that provides ad hoc funds for
natural disasters. Both of these institutional arrangements provide opportunities to share
covariate natural disaster risk.
Table 2:Reasons for experiencing an economic crisis
Economic sector  Wealth
All  Farm  Non-farm  Farm &  Lowest 2  Third  Fourth
non-farm  quartiles  quartile  quartile





Low income due to:
Low yields  23  48  5  22  11  27  27
Low prices  6  11  3  4  4  4  11
Low sales  21  1  34  33  20  21  22
Weak demand for  12  3  18  13  18  8  7
services
Illness of  4  6  3  2  3  7  2
entrepreneur
Other  9  11  9  5  12  6  9
Subtotal  75  80  72  79  68  73.  78
High expenditures
due to:
Illness of  18  18  18  17  20  22  15
entrepreneur or HH
member
Other  7  2  10  4  12  5  7
Subtotal  25  20  28  21  32  27  22
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100
Note:  The survey, conducted in July-August 1994 covered 1,944 rural  households in Guanajauto,  Puebla,
Taumalipas and Veracruz.
Source:  World Bank (1995).
5Sources of income risks faced by small/resource  poor  farmers in Mexico
A 1994 survey of rural entrepreneurs  (REs), indicated that about 60 per cent of the
respondents experienced  an 'economic crisis'  during the  1989 to 1994 period, with about
half of all of these events occurring in 1993  and 1994 (World Bank  1995). The reasons
given for experiencing  an economic crisis are presented in Table 2.
With respect to the sources of risk, farm RE,s attributed almost half of the economic crises
to low yields, showing the importance of natural disaster risk in these regions of Mexico.
Illness of the RE or members  of the household were the source of about 20 per cent-25 per
cent of the reported economic crises - mostly due to unexpected increases in expenditures
(as opposed to income losses). For non-farrn or mixed farm/non-farm REs, economic crises
related directly to low yields were considerably lower. For these REs, about half of the
economic crises were attributed to low sales and weak demand for services.
With respect to the sources of risk for poorer REs,  low sales and weak demand for services
accounted for about 40 per cent of the economic crises, with only 11  per cent from low
yields and about 4 per cent from low prices. This is consistent with the fact that the poorest
REs obtain most of their income from non-f-arm sources and also that they use low yielding,
yet hardy, traditional varieties primarily for home consumption.  Economic crises attributed
to illness of the RE and/or family members were the source of 23 per cent of the crises
(more than the total from low yields and low prices).  REs in the third and fourth quartiles
attributed 27 per cent of the crises to low yields. REs in the fourth quartile reported about
12 per cent of the crises could be attributed to low prices.  This is consistent with the profile
of wealthier farmers being more exposed to price risks. Thus, traditional  crop insurance -
even when assuming that it could effectively mitigate  income losses from yield shortfalls -
could only possibly help small farmers manage one (and perhaps not as significant), of
several, sources of income risks.
How smal farmers in Mexico manage their income risks
Besides looking at the various  sources of income risk, it is also important to assess  the risk
management  strategies and capabilities of smnall  farmers. Unfortunately,  the 1994 survey
(World Bank 1995)  did not report on risk reduction (e.g., diversification)  and/or risk
mitigation strategies  (e.g., crop insurance,  savings), but only on risk coping strategies.
However, the reported risk coping strategies do shed some light on alternative risk
management  strategies available to small farmers.
The major risk coping strategies for small farmers were increased labour market
participation by the farmer and/or household members (38 per cent), reduced consumption
(22 per cent), interest-free  loans and/or donations from friends and relatives  (15 per cent),
sales of assets - notably livestock - (10 per cent) and interest-bearing loans from formal or
informal sources. Interestingly, only about one per cent of the respondents reported that
they delayed repayment of loans (although, only a small proportion had access to formal or
informal loans).  It was also noted (World Bank 1995) that loans for consumption
smoothing were usually received from infonnal lenders (since formal lenders usually
restrict loans to productive purposes),  and that interest rates for these infonmal loans were
6considerably higher than for formal sector loans,  although repayment rates were more
flexible and based on the ability to repay. Another, more recent study of rural financial
markets  (World Bank 2000c) indicates that many small farmers resort to a variety of self-
insurance strategies  that include precautionary savings - primarily using livestock and/or
food stocks - along with social  capital (e.g.,  assistance through social networks, including
remittances  from relatives living outside the area) and, to a much lesser extent, financial
assets (e.g.,  savings). A major problem with holding livestock  as a form of savings to be
used in times of economic crisis is that many farmers might also be experiencing  such a
crisis, particularly if it is driven by something like a major drought. If many farmers have
the same problem and attempt to sell their livestock at the same time, this can create a
covariate risk for livestock prices, as the market is flooded with animals.
Governmentprogrammes
The government of Mexico  funds a number of social programmes designed  to assist
vulnerable rural households.  The assistance includes traditional means-tested  support
programmes, the largest of which is PROGRESA,  which provides monetary  and in-kind
payments  to poor rural households  for education,  health and nutrition. Three programmes,
however, are 'event triggered' and relate to parametric insurance.  Two programmes involve
subsidizing market-based  instruments for risk.  ASERCA,  an agency housed in the
Agriculture Ministry provides technical advise and dollar-denominated  price insurance for
key commodities.  A portion of the premium is paid by the government if the insurance does
not pay out - that is, if the underlying option is not 'in the money'. A second programme
subsidizes the premium on privately provided traditional crop insurance.  Until recently, a
publicly owned company,  AGROASEMEX,  sold crop insurance directly in competition with
private providers.
In the next section, we examine in more detail the third programme,  FONDEN.  The
programme is a financing scheme in which federal and matching state funds are directed in
response to natural disasters.  In terms of resources, the programme is largely about
financing the repaid repair of public infrastructure  - especially roads and bridges.  A
component of the programme also responds  to lost incomes of farmers affected by natural
disasters. For example, under the programme,  drought or flooding will release  funds that
states can use to provide direct payments to farmers and to finance temporary programmes
like the temporary employment programme, PET, a self-targeting work programme related
to improving public infrastructure  and soil and forest resources.  Because the programme is
triggered by natural disasters, it plays a role similar to crop insurance for farming
households. A key difference, however, is the FONDEN is event triggered,  and therefore,
loosely,  a parametric  triggered instrument.  We return to this topic later in the paper.
7Public policy  alternatives for managing  anad coping with natural disaster risk
Generally,  and particularly in Mexico,  two rnajor courses have been tried to give
individuals the opportunity to manage or cope with natural disaster risk:  1) traditional  crop
insurance  that gives individuals  the opportunity to protect against natural disaster risk ex
ante; and 2) disaster aid that gives assistance post hoc. There are important differences
between these strategies  that involve access, incentives,  and costs to society. Free disaster
aid also can work at cross-purposes  with crop insurance by reducing the incentives  for
individuals to purchase insurance.
Problems with traditional insurance
Government supported crop insurance has been touted for years  as being an important
innovation for helping rural households manage risk. A market-based,  risk-sharing
insurance alternative for agriculture has many potential advantages. If society can reduce
the risk from growing agricultural commodities,  then much of the market failure in
supplying credit may be addressed.  Crop insurance can be used as collateral for small and
medium farmers that would not be able to obtain credit otherwise.  These arguments are
persuasive  since credit plays a major role in development  and the linkage between credit
and the pace of technological  development is well documented.
Still, there are no examples of successful crop insurance programmes without heavy
reliance on government subsidies (Hazell (1992), Skees, Hazell, and Miranda (1999),  Skees
1999b; Skees 2001). Providing individual crop insurance requires significant monitoring
and some form of farm level inspection to verify crop losses. Farm level inspection of small
plots of land farmed by the rural poor is cost prohibitive for a private firm. Further, public
funds to support crop insurance are also questionable  since these funds likely have a higher
return when used for other purposes. In short, there is a direct negative relationship between
farm size and transaction costs in delivering traditional farm level crop insurance that raise
serious questions about the social benefits of such efforts.
Traditional crop insurance is always directly tied to a crop. Therefore,  one must grow the
crop to be eligible for the benefits. Even if crop insurance could be provided with low
government costs, crop insurance would be of limited value to the rural poor since income
from growing crops is generally a small proportion of the household portfolio. For
example, in Mexico only around 20 per cent of the poor rural farm household incomes
come from own farm activities (crops and livestock). Paying premiums for crop insurance
is even more problematic  for the rural poor.
More fundamentally,  adverse selection and moral hazard are serious problems in providing
traditional  crop insurance.  This adds to the cost of crop insurance.  It also reduces the
portion of actual crop value that can be insured since high deductibles  or co-payments are
used as one way to reduce problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Finally, because
of the large covariate risk associated with insuring crop yields, there is a need to use
international reinsurers to cover the risk.
8Insurance for catastrophic natural disaster risk is in low supply and can become cost
prohibitive for the poor for a variety of reasons (Skees and Barnett 1999).  Since the risk
from insuring natural disasters cannot be pooled (especially in developing countries) the
primary insurers rely heavily on traditional reinsurance markets. Reinsurance markets are
inefficient,  costly, and suffer from pricing cycles that respond to major losses (Froot;
Kunreuther et al.  1995, Noonan 1994,  Jaffee and Russell  1997, Stipp 1997). Access to
reinsurance in developing countries is also limited. Reinsurance  can be expensive or
impossible in many cases as most reinsurers shy away from providing their services for
agricultural  risk in developing countries.  The international  reinsurers that understand
agricultural  risk rightly conclude that there are problems with underwriting  crop insurance
in developing countries.  They also understand that they can make more money
concentrating  on the US market that is heavily subsidized.
Finally, decision makers have a cognitive problem in assessing catastrophic  risk
(Kunreuther and Slovic 1978, Kunreuther  1996). Thus,  even when a decision maker may be
able to afford the insurance, they may make the wrong assessment about the real risk and
decide that the price is too high.
Problems with free disaster assistance
If traditional crop insurance is neither the most appropriate nor affordable means for poor
farmers, what else can governments  do to assist them manage income risks coming from
natural disasters? Free disaster assistance is a common response, even among poor
countries, as the international  community can be quick to respond when there are natural
disasters. However,  international  aid is more likely in the face of major hurricanes and
earthquakes and not as forthcoming when the natural disaster is a slowly developing
drought. Further, disaster aid is almost always post hoc with few rules and no real
knowledge about how much will come and who will get the aid. This raises serious equity
questions and opens the door for corruption and abuse.
In many developing countries, the post hoc disaster aid comes in the form of debt
forgiveness.  Debt forgiveness does not help the poorest rural residents since most of them
do not have credit. For that matter, few countries  actually have disaster aid programmes
that are targeted at the poor. Mexico is an exception as will be developed below.
Economists are rightly concerned with the incentives embedded  in free disaster aid
(Anderson 1976, Dacy and Kunreuther  1969, Freeman and Kunreuther 1997, Kaplow,
Kunreuther  1973,  1993,  1996, Rettger and Boisvert  1979, GAO  1980,  1989). When
households grow to expect government compensation  for natural disaster losses, they will
take on additional risks. If they do not bear the consequences of risky decisions, they will
engage in activities that expose them to still more risk. For example,  in the U.S. well-
intentioned federal relief has likely encouraged  further development along geologic  fault
lines and hurricane prone coastal areas (Noll, Epstein, Rossi et al.). Research  by Keeton,
Skees, and Long suggests that the federal agricultural  disaster assistance  and heavily
subsidized crop insurance encourages  crop production in marginal  areas. Disaster relief
9becomes self-perpetuating  when individuals  don't get proper price signals about their
exposure to losses from natural disasters.
To avoid some of the problems with too much free disaster aid, risk must be internalized  or
at least made explicit.  Insurance and other risk sharing markets make risk explicit by
pricing risk so that decision makers can fully see the real cost of the risk they face in these
markets. Even when free disaster aid is provided, it would be more efficient to make the
rules for such aid explicit and to provide it  in such a fashion that the expected value of the
aid is similar across different regions. Most free aid favours the highest risk regions.
Recent innovations for supplying insurarnce for natural disaster risk
Recent innovations  in the capital markets could provide alternatives for dealing with natural
disaster risks. These inlovations have potential to make insurance for natural disasters
more affordable  and more accessible even in developing  countries.  A convergence of
traditional  insurance markets  and capital markets is underway (Cole and Chiarenza 1999;
Doherty 1997,  Lamm  1997, Skees 1999a).  There are a number of innovations in packaging
natural disaster risk into various forms of tradable financial  assets. Some of these
instruments are packaged as catastrophe bonds; insurance contracts;  exotic options; or some
other derivative financial  instrument, including the advent of an active weather market. In
any case, they all provide the holder with large amounts of capital contingent  upon the
occurrence of some risky event. By purchasing these instruments,  those holding the risk
share some of their risk exposure with market investors. Those selling the instruments  earn
favourable returns and are willing to accept the risk as part of a broad-based diversified
portfolio. These emerging risk-sharing markets should increase the supply of risk-sharing
solutions for natural disaster risk.
While risk-sharing marlcets have been evolving for some time, the development of risk-
sharing instruments based on natural phenomena has escalated rapidly in recent years,
largely due to the increase in natural disaste:r  losses suffered by insurers and reinsurers.  The
result has been a growing market in various types of natural disaster based financial
instruments (Doherty  1997, Skees 1999).
One new instrument used in sharing catastrophic risk from natural disasters is the
proliferation of catastrophe or 'cat' bonds-bonds whose coupon and principle payments
depend  on the performance  of an index or pool of natural catastrophe risk. There are
already successful  examples of using  cat bonds in Japan and the United States to spread the
risks of earthquake insurance,  and expansion of this approach offers a unique opportunity to
link world financiers  and poor people in a partnership that is mutually beneficial.  Many of
the cat bond transactions where designed as parametric,  meaning that their payments would
be tied to some statistic where the probability distribution can be estimated and the event
can be measured  (such as wind speed for hurricanes or the Richter scale for earthquakes).
These indexes  are of course indirect measures of losses.
In parallel with the development  of these financial  instruments has been the emergence of
an active weather market in the US. Since the utility industry was largely deregulated  in
101997, the electricity and natural gas sectors have pioneered markets for temperature based
financial instruments. Now that prices for electricity are no longer controlled, the U.S. has
witnessed wide swings in prices.  For example, in June  1998 the spot market price of
electricity increased  214 fold in a matter of days (Dischel  1998).
Suppliers of electricity and natural gas have long known that their revenues  and/or costs are
highly correlated with temperature.  This is even more so today. By using temperature
contracts  that pay when the temperature is either too cold or too hot, the company can
offset losses that are highly correlated with temperature swings. Today temperature-based
options are traded both over the counter and on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.  On 1
June 2000, the Wall Street Journal reported that after only three years of existence the
temperature market involved US$ 5.5 billion in trades. A Price WaterHouse survey
conducted in May of 2001,  shows US$  7.5 billion in nominal value for the firms
responding.
The weather markets have also spread beyond the US. into Europe and Japan.  And while
temperature for electric utilities remains the primary market, the interest and activity for
hedging rainfall events is growing. Such innovation offers potentially affordable insurance
for catastrophic risk from droughts and floods.  But, even more importantly, as long as the
rainfall measures  are reliable and secure, the weather market makers are eager to place as
many countries into their portfolio as possible, even adding developing  countries. This  is
highly significant since the due diligence for traditional insurance  and reinsurance involves
high transaction costs that create major hurdles for traditional reinsurers in developing
countries.
Using weather based index contracts
Properly designed weather based index contracts could be used in a variety of ways within
a developing country:
1)  as a means of supplying a form of direct insurance for anyone at risk when there major
droughts, freezes, or floods.
2)  as a means of facilitating mutual insurance  and collective action as with fondos in
Mexico;
3)  as a means of providing a form of reinsurance  for the private or government agricultural
insurance;
4)  as a mechanism for providing clearly defined disaster aid in a standing disaster relief
programme  for the rural poor as with the Mexican FONDEN.
The same infrastructure  of relatively low cost measures of weather events and the research
needed to design effective contracts that match the risk of individuals in the society could
be used for each of these purposes  as well. The public good of maintaining quality weather
data can be enhanced beyond the traditional  arguments for why such data are in the public
interest.
11Using weather inder as direct crop insurance
There is an emerging  literature about how rainfall insurance  could replace traditional crop
insurance (Gautum e t al.  1994; Sakurai and Reardon  1997,  Skees, Hazell  and Miranda
1999, Skees 2000a). A key advantage of this kind of insurance is that the weather or
'trigger'  event (e.g. a rainfall  shortage) can be independently  verified, and therefore not
subject to the same possibilities of manipulation  that are present when insurance payments
are linked to actual farm  losses. And since the contracts  and indemnity payments are the
same for all buyers per unit of insurance, the usual problems of moral hazard and adverse
selection associated  with public crop insurance are lessened. Additionally, the insurance
would be easy to adrninister,  since there are no individual contracts to write; no on-farm
inspections; and no individual loss assessments.  This can help make the insurance
affordable to a broad range of people, including agricultural traders, shopkeepers  and
landless workers whose incomes are also affected by the insured events.
Weather index insurance would also be easy to market. For example, it could be sold
through banks, farm cooperatives,  input suppliers and micro-finance organizations, as well
as being sold directly to farmers. Weather insurance is not only for producers  and rural
people. Banks and rural finance institutions could purchase  such insurance to protect their
portfolios against defaults caused by severe weather events. Similarly, input suppliers could
be the purchasers of such insurance.  Once financial institutions can offset the risk with this
type of index insurance  contracts, they would be in a better position to expand credit to
farmers, at perhaps improved terms.
There are yet only few applications of weather-based  index insurance in agriculture. There
is an insurance plan in Canada in the province of Ontario that uses rainfall indexes and
another one in Alberta for corn that uses temperature-heat  units. Also, a private insurance
company  in Argentina is offering a rainfall insurance contract to a milk-producing
cooperative (there is strong positive correlation between rainfall and milk yields). While the
overall number of applications is still relatively small, the interest is growing. There are
several applications  of index insurance in  agriculture not based on rainfall (or temperature)
but on average area yields.  Instead of rainfall,  the index that triggers the insurance
payments  is based on estimates of the average yield for a county or other predetermined
area. Area-based yield insurance has similar benefits as weather-based  index insurance  as
long as there is a reliable assessment of area yields. Some of the countries that have
developed  agricultural insurance products based on area yields are the US, Sweden,
Canada,  Brazil, Argentina,  and Morocco, the latter still on a pilot basis.
The International Finance Corporation  (IFC) of the World Bank group is working towards
assisting developing countries  in having access  to the newly developed weather markets.  In
this role, IFC plans to take a financial interest in these markets, increasing the likelihood of
their success. A specially funded project was also awarded to a working group within the
World Bank. This project has investigated  the feasibility of developing weather based index
contracts for four countries:  Ethiopia, Morocco, Nicaragua, and Tunisia.  Since the project
began,  several of the professionals  involved have begun similar investigations  in several
other countries, including Argentina,  India, Mexico,  Mongolia,  and Turkey. There is clearly
a growing international  interest in weather insurance.
12Designing a weather index insuranceproduct
An index contract is very different than traditional crop insurance.  Unlike traditional crop
insurance where it must be tied to a specific crop with a measure of acreage  and yield
potential, the index contract can be purchased  at any dollar value. Ideally this value would
reflect some measure of income at risk to avoid taking on undue risk or giving any
appearance of gambling.  Since no crop acres must be reported or monitored,  the poor
household can be provided disaster aid based on the portfolio of income. Anyone can
purchase additional index contracts to reflect the full array of income that may be disrupted
when for the household when the major drought occurs.  For example, if a household
earning US$ 2000 per year from a mix of sources estimates that half of this income is
vulnerable during a major drought, they may purchase US$  1000 of value in the drought
index insurance. This would be true even if only a very small percentage  of the US$  1000
comes from crops they grow themselves. Traditional crop insurance would never provide
such an opportunity. In fact, if  the crops they grow themselves were for home consumption,
they would not be eligible  for any traditional crop insurance.
A number of different contract designs might be considered (Skees  2000a).  In a
straightforward proportional  contract the payments would be structured as a percentage of
the rain below a specified threshold or strike level. For example,  let us assume that the
average rainfall  is 300 mm for the three months most critical for the crop season. Any
rainfall below 200 mm creates problems.  With a straightforward proportional  contract, if
rainfall were 100 mm, a 50 per cent payment would be made:
Percentage payment = (Strike - Actual rain) / Strike
Percentage payment = (200 -100) / 200 or 50%
The protection purchased is an individual decision that should be based on value at risk and
the amount of funds that are available  to pay premiums. Premiums are a direct function of
the protection purchased:
Premium payments = protection purchased x premium rate
Indemnity payments are a direct function of the percentage payment and the protection
purchased:
Payment = Percentage payment x protection purchased
For example, with a 50 per cent percentage payment rate, an individual who purchased US$
1,000 of protection would receive US$ 500 (50 %  x US$ 1,000).
Preliminary feasibility  study for rainfall index contracts in Mexico
In addition to the catastrophic  insurance,  insurance based on rainfall for commercially
oriented small farmers  can be explored. A preliminary study was conducted and its
methodology and main results are summarized below.
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the critical crop growing seasons.  The study focuses on four states: Durango, Jalisco,
Tamaulipas and Zacatecas.  The feasibility study has two main parts. First it examines the
correlation between rainfall and yields to determine the loss due to lack of rain. Second,  it
designs a prototype rainfall contract and examines how this contract affects  the variance of
revenues from the crops.
To perform the correlation between rainfall and yields, daily rainfall data were collected for
stations scattered across these states. For yield data, we used a somewhat  subjective
procedure to allocate both production and plantings to each municipal  for the period 1980-
99. To mitigate some potential errors, the decision was made to aggregate the yield data to
the DDR level.
Rainfall contracts were designed to reduce the relative risk of the 19 years of trend-adjusted
yields per hectare for each DDR. Periods for rainfall were selected based on the highest
correlation between yields and cumulative rainfall using the time periods for growth to
determine most the appropriate periods  as well.
The study focuses on proportional rainfall contracts as described above. With rainfall
contracts for drought, the payment is based solely on the rainfall  event. If crops suffer a
serious problem due to freeze,  hail or even excess rain, there may be no payments.  To make
an assessment of how well the rainfall contracts will work, the feasibility study simply
assumes that an insured (e.g. a farmer) would purchase  a value that would equal the mean
yield value within a given DDR. The study then develops an estimate of gross yield for the
DDR with no insurance and with rainfall insurance.
Results from this preliminary feasibility study show that for about 40 per cent of the
planted area in these four states, rainfall contracts  could reduce relative yield risk by up to
30 per cent. These preliminary results suggest that rainfall contracts have potential in
Mexico.
Using weather insurance  tofacilitate  mutual insurance  as with the Mexican  fondos
The introduction of weather index insurance opens numerous possibilities for collective
action among small farmers. By removing the covariate risk due to catastrophic weather
events, this insurance could aid in fostering mutual insurance  arrangements  among
households  and also in the.effective delivery of financial services to them. For example,
informal arrangements  between households  could reduce transaction costs of sharing risk
once covariate risks, such as weather related risks, are reduced or eliminated. Also, micro-
finance institutions (MFIs) are becoming important in delivering financial services to the
rural poor, but can be victims of natural catastrophes  (Nagarajan  1998). Moreover,  as
Morduch (1999) observes  generous donor funds have been key to the role that MFIs have
played in providing  services after the occunrence of catastrophes but he argues that these
donations are unlikely to continue. This increases the important role that natural
catastrophic insurance can play in both adding to the services that MFIs provide and in
adding to their sustainability  in light of a local natural catastrophe.  Nagarajan (1998) posed
the questions on whether MFIs can develop programmes that could serve as a social safety
14net following a natural catastrophe  and whether they could develop products to manage  and
mitigate natural catastrophe risks to protect their clients and their portfolio.  It can be argued
that MFIs could perhaps  deliver insurance and natural catastrophe  aid to their communities
if they (MFIs) have access to catastrophic weather insurance.  Black, Hu and Barnett (1999),
Skees (1999a)  and Zeuli  (1999) extend these ideas to the US by arguing that cooperatives
could purchase the area based yield insurance and become mutual insures.
Introducing weather insurance to mutual insurance or micro-finance schemes has the
additional benefit of dealing with the problem of basis risk. That is the problem that
weather events may not have the same impact on all farmers within a region; not everyone
has the same  loss. This basis risk is perhaps  an important problem in the use of weather
insurance contracts by individual farmers, particularly small ones. However,  it is possible
to reduce the basis risk if a group of farmers obtains such insurance  and has ex ante
arrangements  to distribute the payments within the group based upon predetermined
criteria. In effect, the group obtains formal insurance  to cover systemic and catastrophic
risks and relies on informal arrangements  to distribute the payments within the group.
A good example of how catastrophic  weather insurance could enhance mutual insurance
arrangements  among farmers can be provided by the Mexican  fondos de aseguramiento, or
fondos for short. Fondos are groups of farmers  formed for the purpose of providing mutual
crop insurance to their members.  There are about 200 fondos in operation in Mexico having
some 70,000 farmers in total as members. They are non-profit,  civil associations and they
operate  in such a way that the collected premiums  create reserves  to pay indemnities and
cover the operational  costs.  However,  in the event of severe weather events, the collected
premiums and reserves are not sufficient to cover the losses. This is because natural
catastrophes  affect all farmers in the fondo simultaneously and their mutual insurance needs
to make large payments  to all of them at the same time. Preliminary analysis suggests that
drought, excess humidity and frost as the main weather perils that cause catastrophic risks
for the fondos. That is, fondos run out of collected premiums and reserves to pay for losses
mainly due to these severe weather events. Thus, obtaining insurance for these weather
perils is crucial for the financial viability of the fondos.
Using index contractsfor  disasterfunds  as with the Mexican FONDEN
As was established earlier, in countries where the rural poor have been engaged in
livelihood diversification,  the variety of income sources may still be exposed to risks from
major natural disasters.  Not only can the own farm income suffer, but the opportunities to
earn a wage in various activities that are directly tied to agriculture will also become
limited. Further, the link connecting the non-farm economy to the farm economy may also
mean that non-farm job opportunities  suffer as well during a regional natural disaster. For
these reasons, tying a standing disaster aid package directly to weather events may be the
most reasonable and clear way to provide assistance to the rural poor during a natural
disaster.
How would a weather based index catastrophe  aid programme work? The first item to
consider is designing a contract that would provide roughly equal aid to all low-income
15households regardless of the regional location.  It should not be designed to replace only a
portion of the lost income. Finding the right weather events that create the most serious
losses requires some research.
The value of free aid can be calculated  using the same method as one would use if the
weather index were being developed as insurance.  These calculations can be used to
provide the same implicit value of aid regardless of the large differences that may exist
among different regions within a country.  This is important as most disaster aid rarely does
that, thus creating perverse incentives  for risk taking.
A logical threshold may be to provide aid for infrequent  events, say,  1 in 20 or more year
events. Using a parametric weather trigger to make disaster payments makes the rules
explicit and transparent.  It also should improve the timing of payments. Even more
important,  such indexes could facilitate an insurance market in weather contracts. The
government would now have the incentives  to maintain a reliable infrastructure to measure
the important weather events. Further, there would have been some level of research
performed by the government to perform the analysis needed to establish the parameters for
contracts that transfer the same amount to everyone.  Private companies could do any
number of things with the information and infrastructure;  they could match the contract of
the government with more money; they could offer a layer of insurance above what the
government offers (i.e., for less frequent events); they could both match and offer another
layer.  The key is that a disaster programme  that is structured in this fashion would not
crowd out private sector innovations rather it would encourage  it.
The Mexican  FONDEN
The Fund for Natural Disasters (FONDEN)  was established in 1996 within the Ministry of
Finance as a last resort source of post-disaster financing inter alia for reconstruction of
public infrastructure,  and compensation to low income producers for crop and livestock
losses arising from natural disasters. In terms of expenditures,  FONDEN'S  coverage of public
infrastructure  is much larger than its coverage of crop and livestock losses.
FONDEN  is a disaster relief programme rather than an insurance programme;  however, the
agricultural component of the programme has characteristics  similar to privately provided
crop insurance.  For example,  FONDEN makes payments in response to many of the same
perils covered by private insurers - for example, wind, drought and frost. In addition,
claims of loss trigger field inspections  as do claims to crop insurers in Mexico.
There are key differences between FONDEN  and private insurance,  however.  FONDEN
payments are triggered only when droughts, frost or other perils affect most producers in a
region - that is, FONDEN only pays out against systemic risks. Thus, individual farmers who
lose their crops due to idiosyncratic risks are unprotected. Moreover, payments from
FONDEN are made only after the declaration of a disaster by the federal  government
following a formal request from the State Governor or head of a federal Ministry, after a
potentially conflictive loss adjustment process has been completed and agreed to by an
inter-secretarial  committee, and after state or municipal co-participation  payments have
16been made to state trust funds. This is a time-consuming and potentially conflictive process,
despite the guidance provided by FONDEN'S rules. Indeed, at times it may take 5-6 months
for FONDEN payments to actually be made to state trust funds,  thereby engendering liquidity
problems  and complaints at the state level.
How well does  FONDEN protect smallholders?
Only smallholders  are eligible to receive  FONDEN payments; however,  the definition of
smallholder varies according to regional and agronomic differences.  Eligibility
requirements range from five or fewer hectares to twenty and fewer hectares depending on
state.  FONDEN  also restricts the number of hectares eligible for payments in order to limit
payments  to any one farmer. In addition, irrigated land and insured lands are not eligible for
FONDEN payments. Payments vary with type of crop. Maximum payments and  area limits
are reported in Table 3.
Table 3: Limits on FONDEN  payouts
Crop  Maximum  payment per hectare (pesos)  Maximum  area
Annual  crops  281  5 hectares
Coffee  315  3 hectares
Fruit and other perennial crops  782  2 hectares
Nopal (cactus)  plantations  281  3 hectares
Tropical forest  731  5 hectares
Temperate forest  731  10 hectares
Livestock  Maximum  payment  per head  Maximum  number
Cattle  197  25
Source: SHCP
Payments for agricultural  losses from FONDEN from 1997-99; totaled nearly one billion
pesos for the three-year period.  Generally, the FONDEN payments were spread out among
many states,  with no single state accumulating more than 6 per cent of total pay outs. The
exceptions are Puebla with 9 per cent of total payouts and Oaxaca with 14 per cent.
When maximum FONDEN  payments are made, analysis shows that they are likely to cover a
significant portion of the investment smallholders  have made in the lost crop. Using sample
data from the  1996 ejido survey,  average production costs were calculated for producers
owning five or less hectares.  The costs and revenue were then adjusted for inflation and
compared to the maximum FONDEN payment of 281  pesos per hectare for annual crops. On
average,  FONDEN payments cover nearly 80 per cent of the irreversible investments farmers
make in inputs and labour when planting their crops.  There are wide regional differences,
however, depending upon the level of inputs commonly used - that is, the crop-investments
of farmers who  use low-input techniques  are better protected by FONDEN than the crop-
investments of farmers  using more costly ones.
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shows that in no region do FONDEN payments compensate farmers for lost income -
covering on average only 8 per cent of expected revenue.
What is the market value of FONDEN coverage?
As already mentioned, FONDEN payments are triggered through a discretionary process, and
for this reason it is difficult to determine the likelihood of a FONDEN payout. However,
setting aside political uncertainties,  FONDEN guidelines provide strict definitions of certain
types of perils. These guidelines  are summarized in Table 4.
Table 4: Guidelines for selected operations  of FONDEN.
Hazard  Activity  Trigger
Drought  Livestock  Two consecutive months of average rainfall below either 50 per
cent of its historical average or its historical minimum.
Crops  As above, but for  any period of time during which damages may
occur.
Frost  Horticulture  Minimum temperatures.  Beans 3. Potato -2, Tomato 0,
Watermelon 3, Cabbage 0, Melon -1.
Fruits  Minimum  temperatures.  Apple -34,  Orange -2, Peach -26.
Grains  Minimum  temperatures.  Corn 0-5, Sorghum -6,  Wheat -9, Oats -
8.
Fibers  Minimum  temperatures. Cotton -1.
Hail and snow  Any  Not specified.  In general, an unusual  occurrence is defined as
event that is below one standard deviation of its historical
average.
Source:  Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n,  29 February 2000.
For perils such as drought and frost, the guidelines  are similar to the types of triggers found
in parametric insurance. Unlike regular crop insurance, parametric  insurance does not
directly compensate for assessed losses, but rather pays out when an agreed upon indicator
meets an agreed upon condition - for example when the temperature recorded at a defined
weather station falls below  a certain level. Consequently, transaction costs associated with
the insurance are lower since field assessments of damage are not required.  Parametric
insurance is also easier to price, since the expected payouts from the insurance can be
estimated by calculating from historic data the probability of the trigger condition being
met.
FONDEN rules  state that livestock owners are eligible for drought payouts when cumulative
rainfall is below either 50 per cent of its historical average or historical minimum for two
consecutive months (any combination of the two events is allowed);  small crop producers
are eligible when rainfall is below these thresholds  for a period of time judged to be
sufficient to have generated permanent damages  to the crops. Although this common rule
18would apply to all states, the variance in rainfall differs among states and consequently the
probability of drought, as defined by FONDEN  rules, will differ among states as well.
FONDEN does not only payout for drought but also for flooding, for excess rains and for
other calamities.  When calculating the value of FONDEN to smallholders,  each peril covered
adds to the probability that FONDEN payments will be triggered. Calculating this number
precisely is impossible;  since not all perils are defined parametrically by FONDEN rules.
However, this general point is illustrated for two parametrically triggered insurances:
drought and frost. As with drought, frost is strictly defined by FONDEN rules. A frost is said
to occur when temperatures  fall below a defined temperature during critical growing
months. In turn,  critical growing months will differ by crop. Consequently, probabilities
associated with the frost trigger will differ by state and by crop. Moreover,  payment levels
differ among field crops and horticultural  crops.
Implications  for smallholders
Although the rules for drought and frost are reasonable and technically well defined, the
analysis above shows that the rules result in differing  levels of coverage  for different
regions. Drought protection is greater in areas where the variance of rainfall is greater and
frost coverage is greater for colder climates and for crops whose growing seasons makes
them most susceptible to frost.  Consequently, the FONDEN rules unintentionally reward
risky behavior.  Such perverse incentives  can be easily changed by rewriting  FONDEN rules
so that payouts are given equal probability across regions. For example, using historic
weather data, define drought as occurring when the rainfall for two consecutive months
falls below a trigger defined as having a 10 per cent probability of occurring.
The rule that makes smallholders who purchase private insurance ineligible for FONDEN
payments  also unintentionally encourages smallholders to take on more risk. For example,
often crop insurance is a precondition  for participation.  In addition,  price insurance is
frequently required as well. The practice facilitates  credit, and also helps protect variability
in farm income. However, smallholders who participate lose FONDEN eligibility - a loss that
may make alternative methods of risk management less attractive.
Comparisons with parametric  insurance
As already discussed, the parameters for drought are well defined within the FONDEN  rules,
but there is room for discretion in the application of the rules. Having a measure of the cost
of discretion can provide insights into how FONDEN functions.  Unfortunately,  the task of
calculating the discretionary component of FONDEN  is hampered by a number of difficulties.
Nonetheless, we provide below a partial comparison, based on estimated  and recent historic
payments  for drought.
In making the comparison, it is worth noting that the Ministry of Agriculture  (SAGARPA)  iS
only one of three agencies that make payments related to drought. Here we are only able to
compare the amount payable by SAGARPA for crop damage.  We find that the historic
FONDEN  crop related payouts for drought are in line, but slightly below, rough estimates
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frequently and that the discretionary component of FONDEN has worked to limit expenses.
However,  it also shows that parametric  triggers can generate similar payments. This finding
is relevant for all programmes,  since parametric triggers could be used for social protection
expenditures that are additional to payments for crop-related losses.
Are there benefits to parametric  triggers  for FoNDEN?
If suitable triggers can be found, there are several good technical  reasons for converting to a
scheme that pays out based solely on parametric triggers. First, triggers  can be derived that
provide equal protection to all smallholders.  Second, reinsurance becomes  straightforward,
since payouts are based on historic probabilities that reinsurers can easily understand and
price. Third, the process is quick and low cost since field visits are not required.
As discussed in the previous section, current rules provide varying levels of protection - as
measured by the probability of a payout - armong farmers growing different products and
among farmers growing the same products irn different states. Consequently,  the
programme protects some farmers more than others. Designing triggers that have an equal
probability of payout repgardless of crop type or location would eliminate this distortion. In
addition, because compensation depends on crop damage - as measured by field inspectors
- farmers who take preventative action to limit crop losses are penalized. In contrast,
payouts based solely on weather conditions would restore normal incentives to take
preventative  action. Of course, any free insurance distorts by providing marginal
compensation without cost. This can also be reduced by designing the triggers so that the
payout is only for rare events.
If short-term budget issues can be solved, there are often advantages for governments who
self-insure. However, in the case of Mexico,  state governments have been especially hard
pressed to meet recent requirements for matching (70/30) funds. Purchasing  reinsurance
from private firms converts large lump-sum expenditures into annual premiums that can be
more easily budgeted. Doing so, however, will come at a price, which in turn, is related to
the probability of payouts. For parametric  insurance these costs can be calculated in a
straightforward  way. In contrast, when payouts include a measure of discretion, reinsurers
will have difficulty pricing the probability of payouts and may be reluctant to reinsure.
Because field visits are not required,  the administrative  costs to FONDEN  should fall if
parametric  insurance is adopted. For this report, we did not have administration costs for
FONDEN  and this perhaps should be the subject of a further investigation.
Breaking  the link between payouts and field inspections has a cost as well. The most
significant drawback of parametric triggers is,  the potential mismatch between  conditions at
weather stations and effects  in the field. This basis risk has an analogy with price hedging
where local prices may differ from price observed in Chicago or other hedging markets.
Whether the basis risk overwhelms the significant  benefits of parametric insurance is  an
empirical  question, depending largely upon the spatial correlation of rainfall events over
time. For example,  in areas with micro climates,  the spatial correlation may be too weak
and the basis risk too high.
I2OSummary and conclusions
A host of risks face poor rural households in developing countries. Social programmes are
needed to address health risk, human capital development risk, and natural disaster risk.
Among the more popular risk management strategies used by poor rural households is
diversification. However,  diversification  as a risk management strategy can hinder
development since gains are possible when households  specialize. Further, since farming
remains a dominant activity in many rural areas, diversification may not actually spread
certain types of risk, in particular, weather events that cause widespread loss for crops and
grazing lands. These covariate risks may impact a variety of sources  of income:  own farm,
agricultural labour, and non-farm income. In some rural areas, even the non-farm jobs can
be tied to the well-being of the local farm economy.  Any natural disaster or general
downturn in producer prices that hurts the local farm economy may have negative effects
on non-farm jobs as well.
If there are no mechanisms  available to help households manage natural disaster risk or
price risk then financial markets will likely be incomplete.  Such incomplete markets will
likely mean that inadequate  credit is available in the rural economy. If farmers either have
no access to credit or exhibit extreme risk aversion and do not borrow, they are unlikely to
adopt available  technologies that are needed to advance agricultural production. Thus,
efforts that combine the dual roles of helping the rural poor recover from natural disasters
and aid in the emergence of market based risk management strategies  are important.
However, public disaster assistance is problematic  as it can send the wrong signals to those
in high-risk areas.
With these issues in mind, this paper focuses on natural disaster risk policies. Traditional
crop insurance is dismissed as a viable alternative for medium  and small farmers in
developing countries. Given recent developments  in international  capital markets we turn to
the potential of indexing weather events (e.g.,  shortfalls or excess rain, extreme
temperatures,  etc.).  While there is no single solution, such indexes could facilitate multiple
objectives:  1) they could be used as an objective means of providing disaster aid based on
relative risk so as not to favour high risk regions; 2) they could be used by state
governments  to fund disaster aid; 3) they could be used by intermediaries  in the economy to
help manage natural disaster risk; and 4) they could be used directly as insurance to
households against certain local natural disasters.
Once governments decide to use weather index contracts, any combination of uses becomes
possible.  The public support of a sound and secure infrastructure  to measure weather events
is a prerequisite for many of the items discussed above. Governments in developing
economies,  with the aid of international development  agencies,  can also process and make
historical weather data publicly available.  To the extent that the capital markets trust the
data for weather events in developing countries,  it may be possible someday to create
efficient  and affordable risk sharing instruments that can be used for multiple purposes.
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